This article explores the relationship between law, society and economy in the context of the contemporary welfare state in the UK. Drawing on themes in Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation, the article identifies the nature of the constitutive role of contemporary social policy and law in the creation and maintenance of markets and opportunities for the private sector in the field of welfare. By reference to recent legislative reforms and developments in health care and unemployment policy, the article focuses on the institutional mechanismsespecially forms of law and social relations -being put in place to foster a friendly environment for those seeking to profit from welfare. It is argued that what emerges from those developments and reforms is a reformulation of the function of the welfare state and related law: no longer are these predominantly driven by a logic of social protection via redistribution to those in need; rather, they increasingly form core components of the state's desire to create openings for the private sector within welfare. In Polanyi's terms, the result is that the institutions that once contributed to ensuring the embeddedness of the market economy in
Introduction
Social policy and related legislation present an opportunity to consider fundamental issues of law, economy and society and, importantly, the interplay between them. As such, they form fertile subjects for engaging with an economic sociology of law. In recent years, however, there has been a tendency in some academic literature to treat them as if they were distinct entities.
The standard analysis and critique of neoliberalism, for instance, conceptualises the development of the so-called self-regulating market as demanding a corresponding diminution of the social or welfare state. The result is that the social and the economic appear in conflict with each other, with the economic sphere being viewed as unable to function properly where the social persists.
2 This article challenges this portrayal of neoliberalism by exploring the connections between law, economy, and society. Specifically, it identifies the constitutive role of contemporary law and social policy in creating and maintaining markets and opportunities for profit making within the welfare sector.
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In one sense, social policy has always been bound up with questions and problems of economy.
The welfare state illustrates this vividly. Thus, through discharging its core function of protecting citizens against the economic and social risks of capitalism, welfare institutions 2 See, for example, D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2007) . 3 The article is therefore in keeping with literature that stresses the centrality of the state and social relations to indirectly assisted the capitalist mode of production. For instance, publicly funded health care and education benefited employers by ensuring a flow of healthy, knowledgeable and skilled workers. What can be witnessed today, however, is a more direct role for social policy and related legislation in supporting capital -something that has implications for assumptions surrounding the traditional functions of the welfare state. Via a focus on recent developments and reforms within health care and unemployment policy and law, the article develops an analysis of the types of institutional mechanisms that are being deployed to facilitate the implementation of this more direct role of social policy and law.
In order to frame the discussion and analysis, the article draws on some themes and concepts from a work that has to a degree inspired the development of economic sociology and the nascent economic sociology of law -namely, Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation. 4 Two specific features of Polanyi's work render it useful in the present context. The first is his idea of the embeddedness of the market economy in society and social relations; the second is the stress he places on state intervention as an indispensable element in the construction of markets. Those features of his work provide a conceptual framework through which to reflect on the important changes in the roles of current social policy and law. On the one hand, it allows for a focus on their constitutive functions in respect of markets and opportunities for profit making for the private sector within the field of welfare. Specifically, it directs us to consider the types of institutional mechanisms -including the forms of law and social relations -that have, and are being, created for the purpose of facilitating such objectives. On the other hand, it confronts us with key questions regarding the degree to which the welfare state continues to operate as a source of social protection for citizens against the consequences and risks flowing from capitalism. As we will see, in some circumstances today's social policy and law are being deployed in ways that create conditions for precisely the production of such consequences and risks.
The reciprocal relationship between social and economic policy
One of the many virtues of Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation is its insight that a self-
adjusting market (what he also calls the market economy) cannot exist for any length of time before it results in the destruction of natural and human life. 5 This state of affairs would mean:
no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system … For once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. Famously, Polanyi goes on to illustrate this scenario by reference to the dangers arising from the fictitious commodification of land, labour and money that emerged at the end of the eighteenth century and tightened its grip during the nineteenth. Rather than land and labour 'form[ing] part of the social organization itself', 7 as was the case in the mercantile system, these natural and human elements of society became subject to the price mechanism, the operation of which was to have devastating social consequences. Disembedded from social organisation and thrust under a system operating on the principles of gain and 'unconscious growth', 8 the functions of land and labour shifted from the non-economic to the economic, and society had to take measures to protect itself. assumption of high moral and personal standards of old and young created the atmosphere in which a new status was attained by the industrial population as a whole.
13
For present purposes, two aspects should be noted from Polanyi's book: the first is the importance placed on the social embeddedness of markets as the conditio sine qua non of the maintenance of society; the second, related to this and especially relevant here, is that for the social embeddedness thesis to be meaningful, the self-protective measures adopted by society from the 1870s onwards had to serve non-economic interests ('the form of a man's life, the breadth of his existence' etc. subordination of social policy to economic policy'. 18 This occurs primarily as a result of internationalisation and the need for national states to remain economically competitive, lest they risk capital flight. In those circumstances, the welfare state comes to be viewed as both an onerous cost of production and an obstacle to a flexible labour market -the latter deemed to be necessary in order to remain economically competitive. The welfare state was therefore redesigned in order to reduce costs and to help facilitate and enhance the establishment of flexible labour markets. One of the mechanisms through which this occurred was (and is)
workfare -a social policy that makes the receipt of state unemployment benefit conditional upon signing, and complying with, a contract stipulating a variety of work-related activities to be undertaken with a view to returning the unemployed to the labour market. Those 'active' labour policies differ from the KWNS's 'passive' system of unemployment support, where the unemployed were effectively unconditionally entitled to receive state support. Today, the discourse is firmly one of obligation and Jessop notes that it reflects 'a general movement away from the social democratic tradition'. 19 We will return to workfare later.
Jessop also highlights the shift away from 'collective consumption' in today's SWPR. Collective consumption -the publicly organised and financed provision of goods and services, such as education, health, and housing by a particular form of national state -has given way 'to more market-and/or third sector solutions to the socialization of consumption'. 
Constituting Markets and Profit Making Opportunities -Health Care and Workfare
(i) Solidarity and Reforming the National Health Service (NHS)
The first mechanism that is increasingly deployed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining markets and opportunities for profit accumulation is the monetary fund through which social services within the welfare state are traditionally paid for. The operating principle of this type of fund is solidarity. This denotes that citizens' resources are pooled for the purpose of spreading risk and that there is an element of redistribution within society. The management of social risks is therefore not merely the preserve of those who can afford to purchase private insurance; rather, it is undertaken by the state on behalf of non-owners of insurance. While this redistributive aspect of the fund has traditionally implemented an underlying concern for social justice and the protection against social risk of those lacking means, as Alain Supiot notes there is also an impersonal element to this 'welfare state' form of solidarity. For while founded on the redistributive ethos described, the system posits a formal set of social relations amongst 22 Wacquant, op cit., p. 71.
citizens, rather than one based on close local or customary social bonds. Citizens therefore make payments to bureaucratic institutions and then bring claims for access to social goods and services such as health care and pensions. This lends a technical quality to the system.
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The argument advanced here is twofold. First, there is evidence in contemporary social policy that points to the use of this monetary fund and certain types of law to create and sustain markets and opportunities for profit making within the field of welfare. The result is a novel form of redistribution -that is, from the public to the private sector -which, as we shall see, has implications for our understanding of solidarity and the use to which the social relations characteristic of this principle are put. Secondly, the impact of these changes has the potential to result in a disembedding of the economy from society as the resources of the welfare state no longer necessarily operate to protect those in need from the consequences of capitalism. care provision that is against patient's interests. 27 It will also be able to tackle specific abuses and unjustifiable restrictions that demonstrably act against patients' interests by deploying its licensing powers and, where relevant, the Competition Act 1998. The effect will be to alter the current situation, in which the bulk of NHS services are commissioned from public bodies, by creating a level playing field in which private providers of health care can compete to deliver NHS healthcare services. CCGs will need, in effect, to ensure that a tendering process for the provision of NHS services is in place, if they are not to fall foul of competition law.
Those developments and reforms do not mean that redistribution in the original sense of that term, described above, no longer occurs within the NHS or that patients must now pay to access NHS services; access to treatment based on clinical need rather than the ability to pay continues to be advanced as a core principle of the NHS across the political spectrum. 28 Nor is it claimed that those recent policies disclose the first instance of any type of relationship between the NHS and capital. For instance, it could be argued that since its inception the NHS has maintained in good condition what Marx referred to as 'a disposable industrial reserve army'.
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But the NHS was not originally designed to be a source of capital accumulation and profit making in itself -that is, as an institution the private sector became directly involved in running or helping to manage. The policies and legislation described above indicate that this has changed. The shift entails a political reformulation of the ends to which public resources are directed.
This manifests itself in the public fund being made to adopt another redistributive dimensionnamely, to act as a direct source for the extraction of private wealth. It also has implications for the idea of the socialisation of risk that lies at the heart of the principle of solidarity, as its meaning is no longer confined to describing the community's pooling of resources to the end of protecting its members against the risk of social misfortune (such as illness); rather, as, for example, PPPs demonstrate, it also incorporates the deployment of this common fund to protect those in the private sector from a variety of economic risks. As Pollock et al note of PFI (now PPP) contracts, they rarely transfer economic risks to the funding consortium, with the result that these usually fall on the public and its purse. For instance: 'Where a Trust wishes to terminate a contract, either because of poor performance or insolvency of the private consortium, it still has to pay the consortium's financing costs, even though the latter is in default.' 30 This social protection from economic risk might be thought to have a more general meaning too in that making available the welfare state's public funds for the private sector opens up an invaluable source of income and potential market and profit making opportunities at times, such as the present, of sluggish economic growth at the macro level. Importantly, though, this shift in the function of the socialisation of risk has the concomitant effect of exposing the community and its members to a diminution in the level of social protection as money is diverted away from core services to the interests of capital -something that dilutes the original redistributive objective of the fund. Legally, this novel function of the socialisation of risk might be conceptualised as a case of joint and several liability, not merely in the familiar sense of debtors being held jointly and severally liable only for their own debts, but in the sense of a group being ascribed such a liability for the debts or costs or harms of others outside of the group too. In the context of the foregoing examples, this means that, via the medium of contract, taxpayers become jointly and severally liable for repaying the significant costs of PPP building projects, including costs flowing from any default on the part of the private funding consortium. In turn, and perversely, citizens also become liable for the social costs they themselves suffer (lack of access to adequate health care, say) as these flow from the liability to pay the financial costs of PPPs from public resources. Andreas Wildt's description of the Roman Law concept from which the idea of solidarity originates -obligatio in solidum -assists in highlighting some of themes involved in this contemporary set of arrangements:
To be the cosignatory of a loan means that one is liable for the reversals of fortunes of another; that one's own economic well-being is no longer completely in one's own hands ... The bonds of fraternal recognition ... are not blood bonds in this Roman conception, nor are they affective. Neither genes nor love, but liability is the bonding force. We are bound together with those with whom, like it or not, our own fates and our own well-being are interwoven. That, and not a sum of money to be repaid, is the sense of the acknowledgement of debt. community to this sector, the underlying source of this obligation is the political creation of a bond between the public and the private, the social and the economic. Through its contracts with the private sector, the state increasingly binds the social and economic 'fates' and 'wellbeing' of its citizens to the private sector, its agents, and market mechanisms such that they become interwoven, or inextricably linked, with these.
What this scenario reveals then is the indispensability of a key welfare institution and its large fund of public resources for the prospects of capital and profit accumulation within the NHS. It also demonstrates how the state moulds this welfare institution and its underlying mode of social relations (solidarity) to work towards those ends. Together with competition and contract law, these become crucial institutional mechanisms for realising the political desire to develop markets and increase the role of the private sector. makes autonomous choices about whether to enter agreements based upon self-assessments of individual utility. As such, the workfare contract does not, in theory at least, compel welfare beneficiaries to sign up to it; rather it emphasises the importance of consent, negotiation and reciprocity in the construction of the agreement. In other words, it envisages formal equality between the contracting parties. This is important as it means that, by being deemed to have voluntarily chosen to enter into the contract, welfare recipients can be taken to have freely negotiated and accepted the responsibilities under the agreement. In other words, they can be assumed to have bound themselves to the obligations in the contract -which are that they work, seek work, or undertake training with a view to working in a flexible labour market. As a number of scholars have pointed out, the empirical reality of workfare and other 'social control contracts' does not reflect any practical implementation of the theoretical contract norms such as reciprocity and consent. 33 The truth is that, if the unemployed wish to obtain benefits, they have little option but to accept the conditions in the workfare contract. There is a vast inequality of bargaining power between welfare beneficiaries and welfare state administrators.
In one sense, however, this does not really matter, for the crucial point is that, whether or not those contractual norms are replicated in practice, they are treated as if they are. It is the ideological dimension of the workfare contract -that is, its ability to represent unemployment and the solutions to it as revolving around a formally equal set of social relations characterised by matters of individual choice and responsibility -that is important here. Possible structural causes of unemployment, such as flexible labour markets themselves, are obscured, allowing politicians to claim these markets as solutions to the problem, rather than as the problem itself.
Consistent with the ideological dimension of the workfare contract is the threat of the application of financial sanctions for either breaches of the contract or a failure to enter into it at all. This has been a core feature of workfare and has been continued and deepened in the WRA 2012. 34 Essentially, unemployment benefit is reduced in stages depending on the severity and number of contractual breaches, the classification of claimant, and the type of workfare programme. While the presence of those sanctions may confirm the critique that workfare contracts are not based on the norm of consent (for the inevitable reduction in or removal of one's unemployment benefit in the event of non-compliance effectively leaves the claimant with no practical alternative but to agree to the conditions), again it is the ideological aspect of contract -that you must suffer the consequences of breaches of your voluntarily assumed obligations -that is crucial in lending legitimacy to a policy designed to entrench flexible labour markets. Moreover, this punitive element of the workfare contract feeds into more populist notions surrounding those groups assumed to be heavily reliant on welfare benefits -that they 34 For more detail on this, see ss. 26 and 27 of the WRA 2012 and the Act's preceding White Paper, Department for are up to no good, lazy, cheating the system etc. The call for them to find a job and relieve the taxpayer of unnecessary costs also serves to further contemporary social policy's aim of securing the presence of flexible labour markets and, hence, a more competitive economy.
It could be argued that other mechanisms, such as the Mandatory Work Activity scheme, have been developed with the same objective of maintaining flexible labour markets in mind.
Purportedly designed for jobseekers who would 'benefit from experiencing the habits and routines of working life', 35 viewed from another angle it is simply a mechanism for ensuring the flow of free labour for employers operating within flexible labour markets. 36 What all of these mechanisms demonstrate however, is the crucial constitutive role the state plays through its social policy in developing and maintaining flexible labour markets. In that sense they bear out Polanyi's observation that the state's intervention is crucial in establishing and maintaining a market economy.
Workfare also contains elements pointing to a Polanyian disembedding of the economy from society; in other words, the policy is not necessarily designed to protect society and its members from the deleterious human consequences of the operation of markets. On the one hand, this can be seen in the provision for the removal of benefits from those failing to discharge their contractual workfare obligations. On the other hand, by binding beneficiaries to flexible labour markets, jobseekers become subject to the economic and social insecurity associated with this type of market. I have described elsewhere empirical evidence suggesting that those entering the labour market through workfare programmes often find themselves in 35 Department for Work and Pensions, op cit., p. 29. 36 The Mandatory Work Activity scheme involves an unpaid full-time work placement lasting a maximum of four weeks.
precarious forms of employment and, eventually, back on benefits -the so-called revolving door syndrome. 37 Consequently, workfare is very different to the types of protective measures Polanyi described as emerging from the 1870s. Importantly, it would not appear to serve the types of non-economic interest -'safety and security, the form of a man's life, the breadth of his existence, the stability of his environment' -Polanyi viewed as a condition of embeddedness. Indeed, quite the opposite would appear to be the case, as workfare jeopardises those interests and threatens to produce what Robert Castel has described as the
that is, rupture of the bond within society. The final outcome, the end of this process, is that economic insecurity becomes destitution and fragility of relationships becomes isolation ... Poverty is revealed as the outcome of a series of breakdowns in belonging and failures to establish bonds, which finally throws the person concerned into a floating state, a sort of social no-man's land. [P]roperty and markets are legal, political and social constructs -the products as well as the objects of regulation; and thus, as a result, not only is the goal of "deregulation" absurd, the dynamics and rationalities of particular markets are themselves inevitably political and legal products which vary according to the legal rightsobligations-regulatory structures that constitute them.
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This brings us to one of the central points to emerge from the analysis undertaken in this paper. profit making in the welfare arena are not the products of formal rational law alone. Rather, they are also 'political and social constructs'. In order to function effectively, formal rational law requires a propitious political and social environment. In the present case, this takes the form of a combination of a large communal resource, based on the principle of solidarity, from which funds can periodically be extracted by the private sector, and the institution of a liberal political rationality within social policy that views social relations as being based on an image of people as self-determining, self-interested actors who voluntarily create their responsibilities via consensual agreements. Given that, politically, it would be unfeasible simply to dismantle welfare institutions and move to a system of private insurance, the desire to use these institutions as sources of economic growth for the private sector requires the careful construction of a legal, political and social system geared towards this end (a 'state-crafting', to deploy Loïc Wacquant's phrase 43 ). While this includes implementing what for the post-WWII welfare state are new legal mechanisms and political rationalities (albeit they have a much older provenance), it also involves putting what might be called the existing system of public or social wealth at the service of markets, capital accumulation, and profit making. The result is that the solidarity fund takes on an additional redistributive function -redistributing wealth away from those for whom it was originally intended and towards those who operate the system -the capitalist economy -responsible for producing the need for a welfare state initially. While redistribution to the non-owners of capital still occurs through the welfare system today, there is greater potential for recent social policy, and the type of law it institutes 43 Wacquant, op cit.
within the welfare system (formal rational law), to produce injustice and human indignity as a result of its concern to further Weber's 'business morality'.
This raises a final point, which is that the form of law increasingly to be found within social policy and legislation becomes complicit in the tendency of the welfare state to produce conditions of social suffering rather than the social protection one had come to expect of it. As social policy becomes concerned with issues of reducing costs by, inter alia, furthering the role of the private sector, and with sustaining flexible labour markets, so the form of law deployed 
